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● Democracy and growth;
● Electoral rules and economic policy;
● The political economy of reforms.
1. Democracy and growth
The evidence  that  democratization  drives  to  economic  growth is 
quite weak;
● Democracy is too blunt a concept;
● The  variables  at  interplay  call  for  a  much  more  complex 
analysis.
Zoom on three particular aspects:
● Democratization, liberalization and growth;
● Type of democracy and growth;
● Ex-ante and ex-post reforms and growth.
1.a Democracy, liberalization and growth
Data  focus  on  sudden  change  regimes,  120  changes  in  150 
countries in the 1960 – 2000 period:
Many  methodological  issues  at  play,  which  require  a  careful 
selection of econometric techniques and tests
Giavazzi and Tabellini (JME, 2005) provide an all-round analysis of 
the relationship:
● Becoming a democracy accelerates growth by ¾ of a point;
● Growth slows around the transition period;
● Both democratization and liberalization have a significant and 
positive  effect  on  growth,  being  economic  reform  the 
strongest;
● Also economic reform (without democracy) produces a positive 
effect;
● Democracy  after  liberalization  has  a  positive  and  significant 
effect;
● Liberalization after democracy has a NEGATIVE and significant 
effect.
A  kind  of  explanation:  young  democracies  in  closed  economic 
environments are more likely bogged down in redistributive conflict 
and populist policies, while young democracies in open economies 
are forced to pay more attention to economic efficiency.
1.b Different democratic systems and economic growth
As we will see, the type of political institutions have an effect on the 
size and the type of economic policies. And what about the effect 
on growth? (Persson, NBER 2005).
● A  parliamentary  democracy  grows  1.5%  less  than  a 
presidential  democracy  and  0.5%  less  than  a  previous 
autocracy;
● The electoral system (plurality vs. proportional) does not have 
any significant effect;
A possible explanation lies in induced policy changes: parliamentary 
and  proportional  regimes  lead  to  a  bigger  size  of  government 
spending,  which,  according  to  the  authors,  might  lead  to  lower 
growth.
● A new plurality and presidential democracy cuts governments 
consumption by 2% of GDP, while a parliamentary democracy 
raises by almost 3% of GDP.
● However,  parliamentary  and  proportional  regimes  raise  the 
probability of a subsequent trade liberalization
1.c Ex-ante and ex-post effects of economic reforms
If  democracy  has  positive  growth  effects,  it  raises  returns  to 
investment.  Since  investment  reacts  to  expectations,  expected 
regime changes might have a positive effect. (Persson and Tabellini, 
2005).
Growth would decelerate before an imminent and anticipated coup;
PT  (2005)  introduce  the  concept  of  democratic  capital,  which 
shapes the willingness of its citizens to stand up for democracy;
● It accumulates under democracy, depreciates under autocracy;
● They  find  that  under  democracy,  the  probability  of  regime 
change hurts growth;
● However,  under  autocracy,  the  probability  of  regime change 
does not have any significant effect on growth.
A  kind  of  conclusion:  Stable  and  persistent  democracy  has  a 
stronger effect on development than democracy per se.
2. Voting rules and economic poliy
Political institutions sistematically shape economic policies;
Political  institutions  are  formal  rules  embodied  in  constitutions, 
laws, and also norms and informal rules.
Four important issues: i) plurality vs. proportional electoral system; 
ii)  parliamentary  vs.  presidential  government;  iii)  term limits  to 
office-holders; iv) direct vs. representative democracy.
Two main “economic problems” of political institutions:
● Representation  (problem  of  the  correspondence  between 
voters and elected). Models of spatial competition (Hotelling 
Downs and others);
● Accountability (problem of the elected's responsibility). Models 
of agency.
2.a Proportional vs. Plurality systems
Key trade-off in electoral systems: plurality favours accountability 
while proportional favours representation;
Does  the  type  of  electoral  rule  have  an  effect  on  government 
spending?
Three aspects of electoral rules:
● Electorate formulas translate votes into seats: under plurality 
rule, only the winner of the highest vote share is elected in a 
given district; Possible adjustment seats at the national level. 
Under proportional rule, seats are assigned according to the 
share of votes.
● District magnitudes reflect the number of legislators acquiring 
a seat in a typical voting district.
● Ballot structures determine how voters cast their ballot. They 
can  choose  among  individual  candidates;  they  can  choose 
among  parties  with  closed  lists;  they  can  choose  among 
parties and candidates within the party.
● However, other issues not considered here are of importance: 
voting  procedure  (single  /  double  round)  and  voting  rule 
(simple majority, qualified majority).
Yes (PT, EER99 and many others): in a plurality system, it becomes 
more  attractive  to  target  spending  to  small  and  geographically 
concentrated groups of  voters  (particularly  when the race is  too 
close  to  call),  leading  to  a  different  distribution  of  government 
spending.
Yes n. 2 (PRT, 05). Post election bargaining drives to a situation in 
which coalition governments (the likely outcome of the proportional 
rule)  spend  more  than  single-party  governments  (the  likely 
outcome of a plurality rule) for about 5% of the GDP – more veto 
power).
Yes n. 3 (Myerson, GEB93). Corruption is better deterred when the 
probability of re-election responds to performance. This is achieved 
when we have personal rather than party ballots and large rather 
than small districts (leading up to 20% change in corruption – twice 
the effect of being a Latin American country). However, the honesty 
vs. ideology story might play a role.
Data  confirms  all  three  theories;  however  the  type  of  electoral 
system mainly depends on one country's characteristics (it is, at 
least partially, endogenous).
2.b Presidential vs. parliamentary systems
In  parliamentary  systems,  governments  are  subject  to  the 
confidence of the legislature, whereas in presidential systems, the 
government is directly elected by the citizens.
Separating powers (as in the presidential system) creates a conflict 
between  politicians  that  enables  voters  to  better  discipline  their 
power to extract rents when in powers. Overall we should expect 
presidential regimes to be associated with lower spending, mainly 
distributed to targeted groups.
Data: Yes, cross sectional data find that presidential regimes have 
smaller government spendings (5% of the GDP).
Also  the  electoral  cycle  differs:  the  expansion  of  welfare-state 
spending  in  election  and  post-election  years  is  significant  in 
parliamentary systems.
2.c Term limit vs. no-term limit
Political  control  is  achieved  in  part  by  re-election  chances 
responding  to  performance  while  in  office:  poorly  performing 
incumbents are removed from office by the voters.
● On one side,  a  shorter  term limit  reduces  the  incentive  to 
please voters and hence the candidate may follow own private 
agendas;
● On the other side, a shorter term may allow the politician to 
impose short-run costs in favour of long run benefits (which 
are in the voters interests).
The term limit implies a change in the politicians behaviour because 
at  the  and  of  their  period  in  office,  they  are  not  (politically) 
responsible for their actions).
● US  as  a  natural  experiment:  statistically,  second-term 
governors  are  associated  with  higher  spending  (and  taxes) 
than first-term governors.
2.d Direct vs. representative democracy
Citizens'  initiatives  and  referenda  should  increase  accountability, 
thus reducing rent-seeking.
● Data with regard to US and CH (both strongly tax-adverse): 
yes, the size of government spending is lower when initiatives 
are allowed.
Citizens'  initiatives  and  referenda  change  the  representation  of 
policy preferences:
● Data:  huge  evidence  supporting  the  lack  of  congruence 
between policy and voter preferences on a variety of issues 
(effect of issue unbundling – Besley and Coate, 2000 – and / 
or instrument of signalling).
3. The economic policy of reforms
Why do certain  countries  implement  economic  reforms promptly 
while others delay, at a considerable economic cost?
● Two types of reforms: i) Stabilization programs; ii) Structural 
reforms.
● The war of attrition model (Alesina and Drazen, AER91) is the 
main explanation:
●  Two parties compete over a costly but necessary reform;
● The status quo is  associated with costs,  increasing with 
time;
● The implementation of the reform is associated with costs 
which are distributed unevenly (the party announcing the 
reform will loose the next elections);
● The reform is delayed because none of the party is willing 
to assume the paternity of the reform;
● A war of attrition starts: the passage of time will reveal 
which  of  the  two  parties  is  weaker  (the  one  with  the 
highest  cost  of  waiting):  this  party  will  announce  the 
reform;
Delaying a stabilization is Pareto inferior to immediate stabilization, 
but it is individually rational for each of the two groups to wait, 
because of the potential benefits of being the winner rather than 
the looser.
Some conclusions:
● It is easier to stabilise more decisively in times of crisis than in 
times of moderate economic problems;
● Stabilizations are more likely to occur when a crisis falls under 
a  strong  government  (presidential  systems,  unified 
governments, few veto points, large majorities, just after the 
elections,...)
● Left-wing  governments  are  more  likely  to  implement  fiscal 
stabilizations  (maybe  because  they  face  less  resistance  to 
reform than right wing ones);
● Governments are able to sharply cut the deficit when the latter 
has reached extreme high values;
● External  inducements  (IMF  conditionalities)  have  a  very 
moderate  effect  (however  there are many reverse causality 
problems).
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